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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Kathleen Tobin appeals her conviction and sentence in a 
criminal case. She argues that the district court 
erroneously denied her request for a "claim-of-right" jury 
instruction regarding an alleged violation of the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. S 1951. She also claims that the indictment 
should have been dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial 
Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3161(c)(1), that the district court erred in 
admitting certain tape recordings, that her trial counsel 
was ineffective, and that she was sentenced under the 
wrong provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. For the 





Tobin was charged in a 14-count indictment with one 
count of interfering with interstate commerce by extortion 
and threatened physical violence, in violation of the Hobbs 
Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1951; three counts of making interstate 
telephone calls threatening to injure the person of another, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 875(c); two counts of making 
threatening interstate telephone calls with the intent of 
extorting a thing of value from another person, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 875(d); seven counts of trafficking in and 
using unauthorized telephone calling cards with the intent 
to defraud and thereby obtaining services valued in excess 
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of $1000 within a one-year period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1029(a)(2); and one count of possessing 15 or more 
unauthorized calling cards with the intent to defraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1029(a)(3). She was tried before a 
jury and was convicted on all counts except those charging 
the making of interstate telephone calls that threatened to 
injure the person of another. 
 
The facts in this case, when properly viewed in the 
government's favor in light of Tobin's conviction by the jury, 
are relatively simple. William Cirignano was the leader of a 
New Jersey-based rock band named "Monroe." The band 
never had a business manager, and therefore Cirignano 
generally booked the band's "gigs" himself. In August or 
September of 1993, Tobin contacted Cirignano and sought 
to be hired as Monroe's booking agent. Tobin claimed to 
have contacts with clubs outside of the New York/New 
Jersey area in which Monroe usually performed. 
 
Cirignano was initially receptive to Tobin's approach, but 
after two meetings he changed his mind. The second 
meeting took place at a club at which Tobin claimed to be 
hosting a birthday party. Tobin had claimed that Cirignano 
could meet the different bands that she represented, but 
none of the musicians at the club knew Tobin. When 
Cirignano introduced Tobin to Rick Seymour, Monroe's 
bass player, Tobin claimed that she was already 
representing Monroe and that she had lined up many 
shows for the band. Cirignano and Seymour felt 
uncomfortable with the situation and wanted to leave. 
Tobin demanded that Cirignano drive her home from the 
club, and when he refused, she became angry. Cirignano 
and Seymour then slipped away behind Tobin's back. 
 
Tobin immediately commenced a protracted campaign of 
telephone harassment. Soon after Cirignano left the club, 
she paged him about 12 times. His answering machine on 
his home telephone line had messages that were vulgar and 
intimidating. One message threatened: "I have your 
[expletive deleted] for a year. I own you. I will do whatever 
I want with you." Tobin also stated: "You don't know who 
you are [expletive deleted] with. And I own you . . . . I put 
too much time and effort into your band." These telephone 
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calls continued at all hours of the day and night for several 
months without respite. 
 
Moreover, Tobin went far beyond vulgarity and 
annoyance and included extortionate threats in her 
messages. She threatened that she would file suit against 
Cirignano and would assert that he filed false charges 
against her, exposed himself to her, and demanded sex. 
She also threatened to report to the Internal Revenue 
Service that he was not declaring income that he earned in 
his business of chauffeuring women who worked in"go-go" 
bars. 
 
Tobin also started a campaign of harassment against 
Cirignano's family and friends. Cirignano lived with his 
parents, and there were three separate telephone lines in 
the house. Tobin called all three lines dozens of times a 
day, and she also called Cirignano's uncles in Minnesota 
and Texas. She claimed to have information about the 
Cirignano family's credit history and their property 
interests. Cirignano's family changed all three numbers 
repeatedly, but Tobin always obtained the new numbers 
even though they were unlisted.1 
 
Tobin also telephoned Jodi Kaplan, Cirignano's girlfriend. 
In her first week of calling, Tobin called Kaplan ten times a 
day. Tobin told Kaplan that Cirignano was a crack cocaine 
dealer and that the police had Kaplan's house under 
surveillance. Tobin also claimed that Kaplan was liable as 
an accomplice for what she claimed was Cirignano's 
harassment of Tobin, and Tobin said that she had notified 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation about Kaplan's role in 
the affair. Tobin threatened to sue Kaplan and Cirignano 
for federal civil rights violations. In addition, Tobin left anti- 
Semitic slurs on Kaplan's answering machine and taunted 
Kaplan about Kaplan's father's terminal illness. 
 
Tobin also threatened Cirignano with physical violence. 
Tobin left messages for Cirignano intimating that he should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Tobin obtained these numbers by calling the telephone company and 
posing as an employee in the repair department or as an anxious parent 
seeking the new number. Bell Atlantic traced these calls to Tobin's 
residence in Queens. 
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get bodyguards and claiming that she was somehow 
connected to an outlaw biker gang that would kill him. She 
declared: "I am coming to find you," and she said that 
Cirignano would wind up "hanging from a [expletive 
deleted] tree." 
 
Of particular relevance to this appeal are Tobin's threats 
to destroy the band. Tobin claimed that she had listed 
herself as Monroe's representative and that when clubs 
called to book gigs, she was going to tell them that the 
band was "over" and "non-existent." Tobin faxed a letter 
that said that "Monroe sucks and Billy [Cirignano] is a five- 
foot-four-inch troll, tattooed 35-year-old lo[ ]ser. Monroe is 
dead." Tobin also followed through on her threats by 
terrorizing a club promoter so that he dropped Monroe from 
a billing that had previously been arranged by the band. On 
another occasion, Tobin told Cirignano that she would have 
him arrested if he and the band played at a particular club. 
As a result, Monroe canceled that performance. Tobin had 
also threatened the club owner, who independently told 
Cirignano that it would not have been advisable for the 
band to play that gig.2 
 
Tobin was arrested on March 23, 1995. Her jury trial 
commenced on September 3, 1996, and on September 20, 
1996, the jury convicted her of all charges except making 
interstate telephone calls that threatened to injure the 
person of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 875(c). On 
April 30, 1997, she was sentenced to a 46 month term of 
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised 




A. Tobin's first argument is that the district court erred 
in denying her request for a "claim-of-right" jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Tobin also obtained numerous fraudulent calling card accounts in 
other people's names, including Cirignano's. This was the basis of the 
seven counts of trafficking in and using unauthorized telephone calling 
cards and the one count of possessing 15 or more unauthorized calling 
cards with the intent to defraud. No issues have been raised in this 
appeal regarding these charges. 
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instruction. The claim-of-right defense to a Hobbs Act 
violation requires that the government prove that the 
defendant did not have a legitimate claim to the thing of 
value that is the subject of the alleged extortionate act and 
that the defendant knew that he or she did not have such 
a claim. See, e.g., United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 
773 (1st Cir. 1989) ("for purposes of the Hobbs Act, the use 
of legitimate economic threats to obtain property is 
wrongful only if the defendant has no claim-of-right to that 
property"). The defense is derived from the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), 
in which the Court held that threats and violence that 
occurred during the course of a labor strike were not 
covered by the Hobbs Act because the striking workers had 
a legitimate right to the things of value that they ultimately 
received. The Court relied in part on legislative history that 
pointed to the exclusion of labor violence from the purview 
of the Hobbs Act. 
 
This circuit, as well as many others, originally limited the 
claim-of-right defense to the particular context in which it 
was decided, namely, labor-management conflicts. See 
United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 297-99 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(limiting Enmons to "create a claim-of-right defense only in 
those situations in which the use of force is expressly 
identified by Congress as being outside the purview of the 
Hobbs Act"); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 
1979) (no claim of right defense outside of the labor 
violence context). Recently, however, this court adopted the 
reasoning of the First Circuit's Sturm decision and held that 
the claim-of-right defense applies to non-labor cases, so 
long as the threats involved are purely economic. Brokerage 
Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 
1998). The court held that, in a case in which the alleged 
perpetrator makes purely economic threats, there is no 
violation of the Hobbs Act unless the victim had a 
preexisting right to be free of the economic fear that the 
defendant utilized. Id. at 526. 
 
As an example of a case in which the claim-of-right 
defense applies, the Brokerage Concepts panel cited Viacom 
Int'l v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) aff'd on 
other grounds, 946 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991). See Brokerage 
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Concepts, 140 F.3d at 524-25. In Viacom, a corporate raider 
engaged in what is referred to as "greenmail," i.e., the 
raider amassed Viacom stock and threatened a corporate 
takeover unless the company purchased his stock at a 
premium over the market price. The Viacom court held that 
this threat did not constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act 
because Viacom did not have a preexisting right to be free 
from the threat of a takeover. 747 F. Supp. at 213. 
 
Tobin argues that, under the caselaw cited above, she 
was entitled to a jury instruction about the claim-of-right 
defense. She is in error. The caselaw focuses on whether 
the victim of the extortionate activity had a preexisting right 
to be free from the threats invoked, and here Tobin's 
victims plainly possessed such a right. Tobin's actions went 
far beyond the hard bargaining tactics utilized in Brokerage 
Concepts and Viacom. Tobin did not threaten to pursue 
legal action to enforce the oral contract that she claimed 
existed. Rather, she threatened unrelated lawsuits alleging 
sexual harassment; she circulated flyers proclaiming that 
"Monroe is dead;" and she threatened Cirignano that 
 
       Club owners are not booking you in New York City . . . . 
       Nobody wants you. You're washed up. You'll see what 
       happens when all these directories come out and 
       you're listed under my company name, and I get calls, 
       you're finished. You're history, the band's over. That's 
       exactly what I'll tell them. All the fan mail that I get, 
       goes right back, telling them, the band is non-existent. 
 
App. at 2399. 
 
Moreover, Cirignano and his associates certainly had the 
right to be free from Tobin's campaign of telephone 
harassment. As previously noted, Tobin made innumerable 
telephone calls to Cirignano's pager and home telephone, as 
well as to his parents, his girlfriend, and others. No matter 
how often these individuals changed their telephone 
numbers and requested that they be kept unlisted, Tobin 
obtained those numbers and began the harassment anew. 
Tobin's actions -- unlike those in Brokerage Concepts and 
Viacom -- are certainly within the purview of the Hobbs 
Act. 
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In view of the evidence regarding Tobin's conduct, the 
district judge did not err in refusing to give a claim-of-right 
instruction to the jury. It was entirely appropriate for the 
district court to decide that the evidence precluded the 
instruction as a matter of law. In Sturm, 870 F.2d at 773, 
the court found as a matter of law that the claim of right 
instruction was inapplicable because a debtor did not have 
the right to charge a creditor for locating collateral.3 In the 
present case, Tobin did not have the right to seek to enforce 
her alleged oral contract through a campaign of telephone 
terrorism. The claim of right instruction was clearly 
unwarranted, and the district court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury on the defense.4 
 
B. Tobin's next argument is that the district court erred 
in refusing to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy 
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3161(c)(1), because more than 70 
non-excludable days elapsed from the date of her 
indictment on March 14, 1995, to the commencement of 
her trial on September 3, 1996. Specifically, Tobin argues 
that 21 days elapsed from March 24, 1995, through April 
27, 1995, and that 54 days elapsed from December 7, 
1995, through January 31, 1996, for a total of 75 days. She 
further points to eight days that elapsed from June 24, 
1996, through July 3, 1996. The government concedes that 
these last eight days were non-excludable. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Sturm, the victim was the creditor of the defendant and had 
repossessed the defendant's airplane. The defendant sought to seek a fee 
from the creditor for locating the airplane's logbooks. 
 
4. Tobin also argues that the district court erred in not repeating the 
definition of "knowing and wilfully" each time the district court 
discussed 
the Hobbs Act counts. Tobin does not contest that the district court 
properly instructed the jury as to the definition of the terms. Since 
Tobin 
did not object to the charge at trial, this issue is reviewed only for 
plain 
error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
Given that the mens rea elements of "knowing and wilfully" applied to 
several offenses within the jury charge, it was not necessary for the 
court 
to define the terms each time they appeared. See United States v. Lake, 
No. 97-7462, slip op. at 10-11 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Sokolow, 
91 F.3d 396, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1996) (where district court properly defined 
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The government argues that Tobin's argument fails 
because the time period from January 11, 1996, through 
January 31, 1996, was excludable in its entirety. 5 Working 
backwards from January 31, 1996, the government 
maintains that January 31 is excludable because Tobin 
filed motions on that day, thereby stopping the clock. 18 
U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1)(F). The period between January 24, 
1996, and January 30, 1996, is excludable, the government 
contends, because Tobin's attorney met with Pretrial 
Services on January 24 and discussed Tobin's refusal to 
comply with the magistrate judge's order to undergo a 
mental evaluation. (The magistrate judge had ordered the 
evaluation on March 25, 1995.) Because Tobin refused to 
comply with the earlier order, the district court ordered a 
competency hearing on January 25, 1996. At that hearing, 
the government argued that Tobin was in flagrant violation 
of the order to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The 
government contends that its argument at the hearing was 
the functional equivalent of a motion and thereby stopped 
the clock from January 25, 1996, through January 31, 
1996, while the motion was pending. 
 
The time period from January 11, 1996, through January 
24, 1996, is excludable, the government argues, because 
Tobin's counsel told Pretrial Services and the government 
that Tobin's petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the 
magistrate judge's order regarding the psychiatric 
evaluation order had been denied. The government argues 
that she should have immediately submitted to the 
evaluation, but she did not do so. Rather, her attorney 
asked for two weeks so that he could make arrangements 
for Tobin to be evaluated and could try to convince her to 
comply. The government argues that this time period 
should be excluded because the delay was due solely to 
Tobin's intransigence and not to any fault on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Tobin argues that the government waived this argument by not 
presenting it in the government's briefs below. This is incorrect. The 
government clearly raised this argument to the district court and the 
court accepted this argument in denying Tobin's Speedy Trial motion. 
App. at 560-62. In any event, because our affirmance of the decision 
below can be premised on any legitimate ground, even one not advanced 
below, Tobin's waiver argument fails. 
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government's part. Cf. United States v. Bey, 499 F.2d 194 
(3d Cir. 1974) (in Sixth Amendment speedy trial context, 
time caused by defendant's failure to submit to court- 
ordered psychiatric examination was excludable from the 
analysis). The government contends that because the time 
period from January 11, 1996, through January 31, 1996, 
was excludable in its entirety, only 35 days elapsed from 
December 7, 1995, through January 10, 1996. This results 
in a total of 64 non-excludable days before trial. 
 
The government's arguments are persuasive. Although 
there was never a formal motion, the government did, in 
effect, move to have Tobin comply with the competency 
evaluation that had been ordered in March of 1995. 
Moreover, since the order had been in effect for more than 
ten months and Tobin had yet to comply, it is unreasonable 
to include the two-week delay that had been requested by 
Tobin's counsel in order to convince her to comply with a 
court order that had been challenged without success in 
the Supreme Court. Although Bey, supra, involved a speedy 
trial claim under the Sixth Amendment, rather than the 
Speedy Trial Act, we nevertheless find Bey's reasoning to be 
apposite and persuasive. A defendant's unwillingness to 
comply with a valid competency examination order should 
not be counted against the government. Since only 35 days 
should be included, along with the eight- and 21- day 
periods that the government concedes, only 64 days 
elapsed. As a result, the district court did not err in 
refusing to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act 
grounds. 
 
C. Tobin next argues that the district court erred in 
admitting into evidence various audio tapes that had 
purportedly come from William Cirignano's telephone 
answering machine and contained threatening messages 
from Tobin. The government laid a foundation for the 
admission of the tapes through Cirignano, and defense 
counsel requested the opportunity to voir dire Cirignano 
about how the tapes had been made. During the voir dire, 
Cirignano denied having edited the tapes. After voir dire, 
defense counsel stated that he had no further questions, 
and the tapes were received into evidence. 
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After the government had rested, Tobin called an expert 
witness who testified that one of the messages on one of the 
13 tapes had been edited, contrary to Cirignano's 
testimony. The expert explained that the tape could not 
have been made on an answering machine, as Cirignano 
testified, since the tape was in stereo and answering 
machines are monaural. Moreover, the expert pointed to 
breaks in the sound that were visible on the tape itself after 
application of magnetic developing fluid. After the expert 
testified, defense counsel did not object to the prior 
admission of the tape at issue. Rather, he argued during 
summation that Cirignano had lied about the making of the 
tapes and was therefore an incredible witness. 
 
In considering Tobin's argument regarding the admission 
of the tape, we must first decide what standard of review to 
apply. Tobin argues that our review is plenary, while the 
government argues that we should not consider the issue at 
all, since Tobin's attorney affirmatively waived the issue at 
trial. It is not entirely clear from the record that Tobin's 
attorney affirmatively waived the issue. We will not exercise 
plenary review, however, because Tobin did not object to 
the admission of the tapes. Because there was no objection, 
we will limit our review to plain error. 
 
Tobin's evidentiary argument fails to meet the plain error 
standard because it is clear that, even if the district court 
erred in admitting the suspect tape, this error did not affect 
substantial rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Indeed, the 
error, if any, was harmless. The court received into 
evidence 13 tapes containing 131 messages. Even if the one 
questionable tape had been excluded, there remained 126 
messages, including 95 from Cirignano's answering 
machine. Even if the district court erred in admitting the 
altered message, or even the entire tape, there were still so 
many other messages that inculpated Tobin that the error 
was harmless. Moreover, an unaltered version of the 
message that the expert had claimed had been edited was 
present on one of the other tapes that had been admitted 
into evidence.6 Finally, any attack on the authenticity of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Tobin has no specific basis to attack the tape containing the unaltered 
or "long" version of the message at issue. Her expert testified, regarding 
this latter tape, that "I didn't authenticate that particular tape, but in 
listening I found [it] to be true [that the message was an answering 
machine message that was received and recorded in its entirety]." App. 
at 1463. 
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one tape should not spill over onto the other tapes, since 
there was no evidence that there were any problems with 
the other tapes. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 
31, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (18 1/2 minute gap on one tape 
"hardly shows that other tapes, on which no erasures were 
present, were not authentic"). 
 
D. Tobin's last claim regarding her trial is that she was 
afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. However, claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel are ordinarily not 
cognizable on direct appeal. United States v. DeRewal, 10 
F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1993). The proper mechanism for 
challenging the efficacy of counsel is through a motion 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. We therefore decline to 
address this issue. 
 
E. Tobin's final claim is that the district court erred in 
applying U.S.S.G. S 2B3.2 (Extortion by Force or Threat of 
Injury or Serious Damage) instead of S 2B3.3 (Blackmail 
and Similar Forms of Extortion).7 We hold, however, that 
the district court properly applied S 2B3.2 to Tobin's 
conduct. 
 
The commentary to S 2B3.2 states that: 
 
       This guideline applies if there was any threat, express 
       or implied, that reasonably could be interpreted as one 
       to injure a person or physically damage property, or 
       any comparably serious threat, such as to drive an 
       enterprise out of business. Even if the threat does not 
       in itself imply violence, the possibility of violence or 
       serious adverse consequences may be inferred from the 
       circumstances of the threat or the reputation of the 
       person making it. An ambiguous threat, such as"pay 
       up or else," or a threat to cause labor problems, 
       ordinarily should be treated under this section. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2B3.2, Application Note 2 (1995 ed.) (emphasis 
added). Tobin contends that S 2B3.2 does not apply since 
Monroe was not an economically viable entity, in that the 
band played only six to ten gigs a year and barely broke 
even on those gigs it did play. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Base Offense Level under S 2B3.2 is 18; the Base Offense Level 
under S 2B3.3 is 9. 
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Tobin cites United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 
1991), for the proposition that in order for S 2B3.2 to apply, 
the threat to the viability of the entity must be of 
tremendous economic magnitude in absolute terms. In 
Inigo, a group of textile workers attempted to extort $10 
million from E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Company, Inc., 
("Dupont"), threatening that they would compete with 
Dupont in Spandex manufacturing using trade secrets 
stolen from the company. This court held that U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.2 did not apply to this conduct because it did not 
threaten the existence of the victim. Tobin interprets Inigo 
to mean that a threat that is of lesser magnitude in 
absolute terms than that in Inigo will not trigger S 2B3.2. 
We reject Tobin's interpretation of Inigo. We understand 
Inigo to mean that the threat that the defendants would 
compete with a multi-billion dollar corporation in one of its 
manufacturing areas if they were not given $10 million was 
not a threat to drive that enterprise out of business. 
Clearly, if the victim had been a "mom-and-pop" 
proprietorship with revenues of $1 million and a single line 
of business, a threat such as the one in Inigo coupled with 
a demand for $10 million would have been sufficient to 
trigger S 2B3.2. 
 
The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Williams, 
952 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir. 1991), lends support to the district 
court's application of S 2B3.2. In Williams, defendants 
threatened the victims with voting to block a rezoning 
proposal if the local sheriff was not bribed. Indeed, 
defendants told the developers that their project was "dead" 
if they did not provide a consulting fee of $250,000. 
Although the amount requested was far less than the $10 
million demanded by the defendants in Inigo, and the 
amount the victims were at risk of losing was only a few 
million dollars, the Sixth Circuit held that S 2B3.2 applied. 
 
In sum, in determining whether S 2B3.2 should be 
applied, the focus is on the economic effect on the 
particular victim, not the absolute magnitude of the threat. 
Here, Tobin's actions threatened the viability of the band. If 
she had carried out the destructive course of action that 
she threatened (and indeed, implemented to a certain 
extent), the band would have faced the reasonable 
 
                                13 
  
probability of its demise.8 The district court thus properly 




We have considered all of Tobin's claims and find them to 
be without merit. For the reasons discussed above, we 
affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by 
the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note also that the Sentencing Guidelines do not limit S 2B3.2 to 
"profit-generating enterprises." There is nothing in the language of the 
Guideline or the commentary to suggest that the provision is limited in 
the way Tobin suggests. 
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